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Abstract
The goal of expanding participation in the European Banking Union was to allow the “outs” to 
enter into close cooperation, but it did not include the simultaneous joining of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM II). Focusing on the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia, this paper attempts to 
respond to various questions. What is the rationale behind the double requirement of having 
simultaneously to apply to become a member of the ERM II and to prepare to become 
a member of the Banking Union via the rule-based “close-cooperation” coordination 
mechanism between the EU non-euro-area national competent authorities (NCAs) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB)? Does the integration of close-cooperation countries’ banking 
systems with the euro-area banking systems support the decision to join the ERM II and 
“opting in” to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)? What are the advantages of 
preparing to become a full member of the euro area and the SSM? It is evident from the 
research undertaken in this paper that there are clear benefits of close cooperation for 
these member states whose domestic currencies are already linked to the euro, in view 
of the dominant position eurozone banks have in their respective domestic markets. It is 
more difficult for a national central bank or NCA to exercise discretion in implementing ECB 
decisions once it is committed to the path leading to full European Monetary Union (EMU) 
membership. Hence the commitment to join the EMU minimises the authority risk for the 
ECB as well as for the Single Resolution Board, as safeguards become non-significant and 
termination is not an issue. The uncertainty about the functioning and durability of the close-
cooperation arrangement is largely removed.
Keywords: banking union, close cooperation, ERM II.
JEL classification: E02, E44, F15, G15, G21, H12, K23.
Resumen
El objetivo de ampliar la participación en la unión bancaria europea era permitir que los países 
outs entablaran una cooperación estrecha, pero no incluía la participación simultánea en el 
mecanismo de tipo de cambio (ERM II, por sus siglas en inglés). Centrándose en los casos 
de Bulgaria y Croacia, este documento intenta responder a varias preguntas. ¿Cuál es la 
justificación del doble requisito de tener que postularse simultáneamente para convertirse 
en miembro del ERM II y prepararse para convertirse en miembro de la unión bancaria 
a través del mecanismo de coordinación de «estrecha cooperación», basado en normas 
entre las autoridades nacionales competentes (ANC) de los países de la Unión Europea 
que no pertenecen al área del euro y el Banco Central Europeo (BCE)? ¿La integración de 
los sistemas bancarios de los países en estrecha cooperación con los sistemas bancarios 
de la zona del euro respalda la decisión de adherirse al ERM II y «optar» por el Mecanismo 
Único de Supervisión (MUS)? ¿Cuáles son las ventajas de prepararse para convertirse en 
miembro de pleno derecho de la zona del euro y del MUS? A partir de la investigación 
realizada en este documento, es evidente que existen claros beneficios de una estrecha 
cooperación para estos Estados miembros cuyas monedas nacionales ya están vinculadas 
al euro, en vista de la posición dominante que tienen los bancos de la eurozona en sus 
respectivos mercados nacionales. Es más difícil para un banco central nacional o una ANC 
ejercer su discreción en la implementación de las decisiones del BCE una vez que está 
comprometido con el camino que conduce a la plena adhesión a la Unión Económica y 
Monetaria (UEM). Por lo tanto, el compromiso de unirse a la UEM minimiza el riesgo de 
autoridad para el BCE y para la Junta Única de Resolución, ya que las salvaguardias 
dejan de ser significativas y la rescisión no es un problema. La incertidumbre sobre el 
funcionamiento y la durabilidad del acuerdo de cooperación estrecha se ha eliminado en 
gran medida.
Palabras clave: unión bancaria, estrecha colaboración, mecanismo de tipos de cambio II.
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The euro is meant to be the single currency of the European Union as a whole. All but two of 
our Member States are required and entitled to join the euro once they fulfil the conditions.
Jean-Claude Juncker 2017
1 Introduction 
Negative externalities can be associated with cross-border financial problems involving 
either instability across European markets, including sovereign debt, or systemically 
important European financial institutions with large cross-border operations and financial 
exposures. Against this backdrop, since the global financial crisis the euro area has stepped 
up an iterative process aimed at internalising some of the potential negative externalities 
associated with the integration of national financial systems, and made tangible progress 
towards capturing potential efficiency gains through policy coordination (Nieto and Schinasi 
2007; Emter, Schmitz, and Tirpak 2017; Claessens and Horen 2014; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 
2010; Brunnermeier 2009).
Such policy coordination has always involved harmonisation in the EU. The Single 
Rule Book is regulatory harmonisation to the highest level, but its creation did not involve 
centralisation of decision-making structures – it was just part of the above-mentioned 
iterative process. This culminated with the centralisation of decision-making structures, but 
only in the euro-area countries, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB) and the commitment to complete the Banking Union. 
The global financial crisis and the euro-area sovereign crisis made clear that full 
internalisation of decisions and policies in safeguarding financial stability within the euro area 
could lead to welfare-enhancing improvements relative to the existing European decentralised 
architectures and decision-making processes at the time of the euro-area crisis. However, 
the centralisation of the euro-area safety net came hand in hand with the real separation 
of the geographical perimeters of the EU Single Rule Book, envisaged to guarantee the 
highest level of regulatory harmonisation as a mechanism of coordination in the EU, and 
the perimeter of the centralised euro-area decision-making structures on supervision – the 
European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council, the SSM and the crisis management 
arrangements (the SRB), hereinafter referred to as Banking Union. Such separation raises a 
number of coordination problems, which have been partly dealt with by a rule-based “close-
cooperation” mechanism for coordination between EU non-euro-area national competent 
authorities (NCAs) and the ECB. In this regard it is important to note the instruments of the 
Banking Union, as regulations confer centralised tasks and responsibilities on the ECB and 
the newly created SRB in euro-area and non-euro-area participating member states. The SRB 
mandate is limited by the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) to those banks 
whose home supervisor is the ECB or an NCA in close cooperation. In view of this, member 
states entering into close cooperation need to introduce domestic law specifically to transfer 
decision-making from domestic administrative bodies to the designated centralised bodies 
(the ECB and SRB), and so participate in the SSM and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). 
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At present, the above-mentioned “close cooperation” has been exercised by 
two countries: Bulgaria and Croatia. Although the expectation of entry into the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM II) and later the adoption of the euro as a precursor to the Banking 
Union was not originally expressed in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation 
2013, in the cases of both Bulgaria and Croatia the ECB Governing Council announced the 
inclusion of their respective currencies in the ERM II. In parallel, it also adopted a decision 
to establish “close cooperation” with their respective central banks following the fulfilment 
of the necessary supervisory and legislative prerequisites. Together, these two steps pave 
the way for Bulgaria’s and Croatia’s future participation in the euro area. The joint application 
to include their currencies in the ERM II in compliance with the convergence criteria to join 
the euro and the decision to establish “close cooperation” between the ECB and the central 
banks of Bulgaria and Croatia aims at solving the “financial trilemma” by moving powers for 
financial policies (regulation, supervision and stability) further to the European level.1
Focusing on the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia, this paper attempts to respond 
to several questions. What is the rationale behind the double requirement of having 
simultaneously to apply to become a member of the ERM II and to prepare to become 
a member of the Banking Union via the rule-based “close-cooperation” coordination 
mechanism between the EU non-euro-area NCAs and the ECB? Does the integration 
of close-cooperation countries’ banking systems with the euro-area banking systems 
support the decision to join the ERM II and “opt in” to the SSM? What are the advantages 
of preparation to become a full member of the euro area and the SSM (e.g. coordination of 
macroprudential and microprudential regulation; coordination of microprudential supervision 
and bank resolution)? 
This paper is divided in five sections in addition to this introduction. Section 2 
analyses the rationale of the double requirement to apply to join the ERM II and to prepare 
to become a member of the Banking Union. Section 3 presents a characterisation of the 
two banking systems in the EU non-euro-area countries (Bulgaria and Croatia) that applied 
to join the ERM II, including the importance of the presence of euro-area banks. Section 4 
analyses cooperation in normal times during the “close-cooperation” period: cooperation 
in microprudential and macroprudential supervision while fulfilling the nominal convergence 
criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). Section 5 analyses cooperation in times 
of crisis when there is a need to resolve or liquidate a bank. In particular, it examine the 
incentives to cooperate under those circumstances in the context of becoming a member of 
the EMU. The final section offers some conclusions.
1  The financial trilemma states that financial stability, financial integration and national financial policies are incompatible. 
Any two of the three objectives can be combined, but not all three; one has to give. The concept was developed by 
Schoenmaker 2011, 57-59.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2117
2 The duality of ERM II membership and entering close cooperation
In the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia, the ECB Governing Council adopted a decision to 
establish close cooperation with the other relevant central banks following the fulfilment 
of the necessary supervisory and legislative prerequisites. In parallel, the inclusion of their 
respective currencies in the ERM II was announced.2 Together, these two steps pave the 
way for Bulgaria’s and Croatia’s future participation in the euro area. (European Central Bank 
2020c, 2020b).3
This is the first time a Member State’s national currency would join ERM II since 
the start of the EU banking union. Upon the introduction of the euro a Member State now 
also joins the banking union, which is irreversible and involves direct powers of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) over its banking 
system. Therefore, participating in ERM II with a view to later adopting the euro also involves 
– for Bulgaria’s [and Croatia’s] as well as for any other Member State’s national currency that 
will in the future join ERM II – preparing for joining the banking union.4
We should bear in mind that the requirement to join the ERM II was envisaged by 
the Maastricht Treaty and policymakers as a transition stage aimed at ensuring that member 
states seeking to adopt the euro can meet the principles of the ERM II, which are as follows:5
—  to ensure that Member States outside the euro area participating in the 
mechanism orient their policies to stability, foster convergence and thereby 
help them in their efforts to adopt the euro; 
—  [to] provide a reference for their conduct of sound economic policies in general 
and monetary policy in particular; and 
—  [to] protect non euro area Member States from unwarranted pressures in the 
foreign-exchange markets.
2  The central parities and the standard fluctuation bands of plus or minus 15 per cent for both the Bulgarian lev and the 
Croatian kuna were agreed on 10 July 2020. See European Central Bank 2020d, 2020a. Following a careful assessment of 
the appropriateness and sustainability of Bulgaria’s currency board, it was accepted that Bulgaria is joining the ERM with its 
existing currency board arrangement in place as a unilateral commitment, thus putting no additional obligations on the ECB.
3  Starting from 1 October 2020, the ECB will be in charge of direct supervision of the significant institutions in Croatia 
and Bulgaria and the common procedures for all supervised entities, as well as oversight of less significant institutions. 
In the meantime, the ECB will carry out an assessment to determine which banks fulfil the criteria to be classified as 
significant institutions.
4  The letter of the Euro Group president explicitly states: “In the future, we expect to follow a similar approach for Member 
States wishing to join ERM II, in line with the principle of equal treatment.” This was the case when Croatia applied in 
July 2019. See European Central Bank 2017; Annex 2 of ERM II Mechanism 2018.
5  Articles 140–142 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); Consolidated Version of the TFEU Protocol 
(No. 13) on the Convergence Criteria [2016]; Point 1.3 of Resolution on the European Council on the Establishment of an 
Exchange-rate Mechanism in the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union [1997]. Inter institutional Agreement of 6 
December 2013 between the European Central Bank and the National Central Banks of the Member States outside the Euro 
Area Amending the Agreement of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and the National Central Banks of the 
Member States outside the Euro Area Laying Down the Operating Procedures for an Exchange Rate Mechanism in Stage 
Three of Economic and Monetary Union [2014]. See also Smits 1997, 465-466, and Zilioli and Selmayr 2004, 133-137. For 
a discussion about other member states possibly entering close cooperation see Jensen and Schoenmaker 2020, 317-326.
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Hence participation in the ERM II is a precondition for as well as fulfilment of the 
nominal convergence criteria to join the euro, and as such it is binding and of a temporary 
nature (ERM II Central Bank Agreement 2006). It should be noted that the currencies of 
Bulgaria and Croatia were already closely tied to the euro at the time of applying to the ERM 
II. Bulgaria had a currency board (first with the deutschmark, and subsequently with the 
euro after 1999) after a devastating debt and banking crisis in 1997. Croatia had a peg first 
with the deutschmark, and from 1999 to the euro, with a narrow band. All the countries that 
joined the ERM have become members of the EMU6 with the sole exception of Denmark, 
which opted out of the obligation to become a member by virtue of Protocols Nos 15 and 
16 (Council of the EU 2019).
After the launch of the SSM, as an integral part of the institutional architecture of 
the euro, it was rational that EU policymakers would expect EU Member States when joining 
the ERM II would require simultaneous close cooperation with ECB, following fulfilment of 
the necessary supervisory and legislative prerequisites. The first step was in preparation to 
become a member of the euro, and the second step to become a member of the Banking 
6  Since the inception of the euro the following members states have joined the ERM II: Denmark and Greece (26 September 
1998), Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania (27 June 2004), Cyprus, Latvia and Malta (29 April 2005) and Slovakia (25 November 
2005). See ERM II Central Bank Agreement 2006.
WHAT INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MEANS
Figure 1
SOURCE: Author's analysis.
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Union. In turn, participation in the Banking Union requires a period of close cooperation with 
the ECB in the context of the “close-cooperation” mechanism of coordination between EU 
non-euro-area NCAs and the SSM. 
The requirement for close cooperation when applying to the ERM II deals with the 
“efficiency” gaps in the pre-existing arrangements that neglect the possibility of negative 
bank sovereign “loops” (Podstawski and Velinov 2018, 63, Dumitrescu-Pasecinic 2019, 
320, 357 - 358). Against this background, as is the case for the ERM II, the “participation” 
mechanism should be understood as a binding requirement of a temporary nature until the 
applying country joins the EMU. 
In this context, the binding and temporary nature of the close-cooperation mechanism 
highlights a particular case of the bespoke general governance arrangements of Art. 7 of 
the SSM Regulation, in which the possibility of “opting out” fades with the incentives for 
joining the euro. Art. 7 of the SSM Regulation and its modalities (set out primarily in the SSM 
Framework Regulation 2014 and the 2014 ECB Close Cooperation Decision) permit non-
euro-area member states to participate in the SSM through a close-cooperation arrangement. 
Figure 1 presents the options open to non-euro EU countries in terms of participation in the 
ERM II and/or the close-cooperation arrangement. Only simultaneous participation with a 
view to joining the euro is incentive compatible, as explained in this paper.
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3  The features of the banking systems as a rationale for entering “close-
cooperation” under the SSM when applying to the EMU
The interconnection of the banking systems of Bulgaria and Croatia with those of the other EU 
member states (mainly euro area) creates incentives for applying to the ERM II to join the euro and 
for “close-cooperation” with the Banking Union following its accessions to EU in 2007 and 2013 
respectively. The higher the proportion of foreign banks to domestic banks, the greater the need 
for cooperation and coordination to minimise the risks of contagion from cross-border banking.7 
There are different drivers in respect of the number of foreign banks in a member state, 
such as the size of capital markets as a source of liquidity, historic liberalisation of financial 
markets to foreign competition, privatisation in the aftermath of a banking crisis, as was the 
case in Bulgaria, and, finally, the opportunity for foreign banks to play a dominant role in view of 
the limited size of domestic banks – as was the case in both Bulgaria and Croatia (Fontán et al. 
2019). Table 1 shows the important presence of EU banks, mostly in the form of subsidiaries, in 
Bulgaria and Croatia. 
The banking systems in Bulgaria and Croatia are dominated by subsidiaries of 
euro-area banks that together have a sizeable share of the market. As shown in Table 2, 
the ECB-designated significant banks in Bulgaria represent 58.09 per cent of total market 
share by assets, and of this share 76.43 per cent is owned by euro-area banks and 100 per 
cent is foreign owned (euro area and non-euro EU). The Bulgarian banking system is less 
concentrated than the Croatian system, a likely result of the devastating banking crisis in 
Bulgaria in 1997. In Croatia, Table 2a, the ECB-designated significant banks are all foreign 
subsidiaries of euro-area banks. The total market share of the significant banks is 72.91 per 
cent, and of that 100 per cent is owned by euro-area banks. The proportion of total assets of 
the top three significant banks in Bulgaria and Croatia is 42.76 per cent and 53.61 per cent 
respectively, indicating their economic importance in these member states. Considering the 
countries’ consolidated banking assets, the banking sector is relatively small in comparison 
to GDP, at 11 per cent in Bulgaria and close to 13 per cent in Croatia, which suggests 
that the systemic risk exposure of the banking sector to the real economy is comparatively 
limited – although a disorderly bank crisis could well morph into a systemic crisis. 
The criteria to assess if a credit institution will fall under the supervision of the ECB are 
set out in Art. 6 (4)(i)-(iii) of the SSM Regulation, and specifically refer to its size, importance for the 
EU or any participating member state, and finally the significance of its cross-border activities. 
While there is further elaboration of the criteria in the SSM Regulation, it is not entirely complete, 
with the ECB utilising its discretion to determine the significance of banks by considering other 
factors as well, as follows:
7  Definition of “foreign banks”: ‘Foreign banks are defined as subsidiaries and branches that are controlled by either an EU or 
a non-EU parent that is “foreign” from the reporting country’s point of view. The data for these institutions are excluded from 
the data on the domestic banking sector and are aggregated under the heading “foreign banks”. The fact that foreign banks 
account for a significant proportion of the domestic banking sector in some EU countries justifies their separate analysis.’ See 
European Central Bank 2019a.
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—  whether the total value of its assets exceeds €30 billion (neither Bulgaria nor 
Croatia has a bank of this size); 
—  whether the ratio of a banks total assets to GDP in the participating member 
state exceeds 20 per cent, (unless the total value of its assets is below €5 
billion). No bank meets this criterion in Bulgaria or in Croatia;
—  for cross-border exposures in terms of assets and liabilities, in view of the ECB 
anticipating directly supervising significant banking groups, whether it has 
identified banks in both Bulgaria and Croatia that fall within this category; 
—  whether the bank is among the three most significant credit institutions in the 
participating member state (see Table 2 and Table 2a– the ECB has designated 
three banks in both Bulgaria and Croatia that fall into this category, which is in 
line with similar euro-area member states), unless justified by circumstances.
In the case of Croatia and Bulgaria, the third and fourth criteria seem to be those 
used by the ECB to assess whether a bank will fall under its supervision (ECB Press Release 
2020e). In line with other relatively small member states, the use of the last criterion is not 
unusual. Although the ECB does not have directly applicable powers over supervised entities 
in Bulgaria and Croatia, it is empowered to address specific and general “instructions” 
regarding approximately 58 per cent of the banking market in Bulgaria and 73 per cent of 
the market in Croatia (significant institutions) in terms of total assets as of December 2018 
(Art. 7(1) of the SSM Regulation and Art. 107(3) of the SSM Framework Regulation).
The ECB, however, exercised its discretion in accordance with Art. 6(5)(b) of the SSM 
Regulation and Art. 67 of the SSM Framework Regulation, to bring into direct supervision a 
number of less significant banks that operate in Bulgaria and Croatia. In this category, the size 
of the bank in comparison to total assets is not the material factor in assessing significance. 
It is useful to explore why a number of less significant banks have been brought under direct 
supervision. The decision of the ECB to exercise its discretion to classify less significant 
banks as significant has not been without controversy (Karagianni and Scholten 2018, 185-
194, Annunziata 2020, 545 - 570, Tröger 2015, 167 - 192). However, the number of banks 
TOTAL NUMBER OF BANKS, BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES: BULGARIA AND CROATIA (2018)
Table 1
SOURCE: European Central Bank 2020d.
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being classified as significant in accordance with Art. 6(5)(b) has been limited. According to 
the ECB list of significant banks by July 2020, the decision has been exercised only six times, 
and in most of those instances the banks are US institutions with multiple entities in the euro 
area. The ECB decision to exercise its discretion to classify banks as significant means 
Bulgaria and Croatia will have more significant banks (five and eight respectively) than some 
BANKS INCLUDED IN THE ECB LIST OF BANKS DIRECTLY SUPERVISED IN BULGARIA AND CROATIA
Table 2
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of the larger member states of the euro area.8 Moreover, they both have more significant 
banks than other similar-size euro-area member states, where only the top three are listed 
as significant. It is important to explore why some banks with very small levels of total assets 
are now classified as significant, which is not really clarified by the ECB on a case-by-case 
basis other than the note that they all are part of cross-border banks. In Bulgaria, Eurobank, 
ranked fourth in terms of total assets, is wholly owned by Eurobank Ergasias Services and 
Holdings SA, which has assistance from the Hellenic Financial Stability Facility to support 
its restructuring and remains partially owned by the facility (European Commission Decision 
2014). In view of this assistance, the ECB has the discretion to supervise Eurobank directly 
in Bulgaria given its significant business operations in the member state. Adikko, originally 
a less significant bank in Austria, is now reclassified as a significant bank; as a result, its 
subsidiaries in Slovenia and Croatia, in view of their significance to the parent, are also 
classed in those member states as significant banks. Adikko was listed as an “other cross 
border group” by the SRB, so for the purposes of resolution fell within the remit of the SRB, 
albeit being a less significant bank for the purposes of the SSM (Single Resolution Board 
2020, Annex I). In our view, the move to supervise Addiko AG group directly in Austria and 
its subsidiaries in Slovenia and Croatia highlights another important dimension to the ECB 
decision to extend significance to this entity, so supervision aligns with the SRB decision 
to class such institutions as important from a cross-border resolution perspective. This 
would also assist with centralising the preparation of recovery plans which fall within the 
responsibility of the supervisor.
8  Whether this is a new policy direction whereby the number of significant banks will increase in accordance with Article 6(5)(b) 
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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4  The supervisory incentives to enter into close cooperation when applying 
for membership of the EMU
The two countries entering close cooperation depict a relationship common among relatively 
small member states that see their banking systems dominated by foreign banks from the 
larger member states in the euro area, where the largest parent cross-border banks are 
domiciled. This top-down relationship between large banks in the euro area and small banks 
outside the euro area gives rise to information asymmetry challenges that are common 
between home and host authorities of different parts of a banking group. In the euro area, 
those challenges have particular consequences (Herring 2007). This is especially important 
where entities residing in the host country are critical to the host market but not necessarily 
critical to the parent group in the home market – an important area of research highlighted 
by Herring 2007 and more recently by Pistor 2010.9 In this relationship either the home 
or the host can forbear timely sharing of information and, critically, decide whether to 
share the burden of financial support for distressed parts of the group with their foreign 
counterpart, only when it serves their self-interest. Thus an acute challenge for small hosts 
is a scenario where their limited importance to the group means they are often neglected 
due to their poor bargaining power. The requirement to enter close cooperation attempts to 
address information asymmetries and the lack of incentive to cooperate among host and 
home authorities, taking the financial trilemma to its logical conclusion by moving powers 
for financial policies (regulation, supervision and stability) further to the European level. It is 
now evident that the relationship between the ECB and those EU member states in “close 
cooperation” in the Banking Union is one that is “comparable” with rather than “equivalent” 
to its eurozone counterparts (Art. 107(2) of the SSM Framework Regulation, Singh 2020, 33).
In both Bulgaria and Croatia significant domestic legislative reforms have been 
implemented to ensure the transfer of administrative jurisdiction over supervision and 
resolution decision-making (European Central Bank 2017). In this relationship, Art. 18(1) 
of the SRMR specifies the close-cooperation countries enact legislation to share the 
responsibility of supervision and resolution with the ECB and SRB. The decisions made 
by the ECB and SRB are executed by the domestic competent authorities and resolution 
authorities. In this respect, the ECB does not have direct supervision of significant banks in 
Bulgaria and Croatia as it does with significant banks in eurozone member states. 
The ECB will instruct the Bulgarian and Croatian central banks as prudential 
supervisors in terms of microprudential supervision and, in part, macroprudential supervision 
(Art. 108 (1-5) of the SSM Framework Regulation, European Central Bank 2018, 2019d, 
2020a, 2019c, 2020b). The latter is primarily within the discretion of the Bulgarian and 
Croatian national banks but will now be open to scrutiny by the ECB, which may request 
adopting or increasing levels of capital and liquidity to manage macroprudential risks (Art. 
5 of the SSM Regulation). Art. 7 gives the ECB the authority to change macroprudential 
9  For a historical perspective see Mayes and Vesala 1998, Pistor 2010, D’Hulster 2011, Ferrarini and Chiarella 2013, 6-10, 
Avgouleas 2012, 422-423.
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capital buffers, but the NDA retains the power to decide which banks are designated other 
systemically important institutions (O-SIIs). For the ECB to fulfil its task, the Bulgarian and 
Croatian central banks are expected to provide data and documents, access to accounting 
records and oral and written explanations. Table 3 shows the complexity of macroprudential 
regulation that impacts banks’ capital as well as the need for coordination between the home 
(ECB) and host (Central Banks of Croatia and Bulgaria) NDAs, particularly when reciprocity 
is required to limit sectoral sources of systemic risk (European Central Bank 2020b, 2020c).
The SSM Regulation, particularly Art. 4(1)–(2) on supervision, Art. 5 concerning 
macroprudential action and Art. 6 detailing the allocation of tasks between the ECB 
and NCAs and NDAs and criteria for designating banks as significant, and the 2014 
SSM Cooperation Framework constitute the legal framework in which coordination 
between the ECB and the non-euro-area participating member states takes place. This 
framework defines the “indirect” authority of the ECB over the supervised entities, while it 
exercises a direct authority over the NCAs and NDAs according to Art. 107(2) of the SSM 
Framework Regulation; the buttressing techniques of the ECB’s operating effectiveness; 
the deterrence mechanisms of the ECB to back its authority; the safeguards of the non-
euro-area member states which lack representation in the decision-making bodies of 
the ECB, in particular the Governing Council; and, last but not least, the termination of the 
close-cooperation arrangement.10
When a close-cooperation arrangement is in place, the ECB decisions addressed 
to supervised entities (both significant and less significant) are replaced by instructions to 
NCAs and NDAs (Art. 108 of the SSM Framework Regulation). NCAs then adopt national 
administrative measures or otherwise execute the ECB’s instructions. As Moloney 2019 
describes it, the ECB decision-making is therefore intermediated. As the cooperation 
arrangement is a precondition to joining the euro in the case of Bulgaria and Croatia, 
economic incentives are fully aligned to develop a good working relationship between the 
ECB and the central banks as prudential supervisory authorities of Bulgaria and Croatia. 
The commitment to join the EMU minimises the risks of exiting the cooperation in the 
absence of arrangements for orderly withdrawal in the SSM Framework.11 
The applicant member state benefits from access to the supervisory expertise of 
joint supervisory teams (JSTs), thus essentially hiring the credibility of the SSM (Lastra 
2019). The credibility of the NCAs will be boosted, as will the reputation of their banking 
systems (Ernia 2019). JSTs are the vehicle for the exchange of information and coordination 
among NCAs and the ECB in the realms of prudential regulation and supervision. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of banking systems dominated by subsidiaries of euro-
area banks. Moreover, the JSTs, which are always headed by SSM staff, contribute to 
10 Article 7(5)–(8) of SSM Regulation; Article 6 of Decision ECB/2014/5; Articles 118–119 of SSM Framework Regulation.
11  The termination of the close cooperation takes place by means of an ECB decision. The ECB shall indicate the date 
from which it applies within a maximum period of three months, taking due consideration of supervisory effectiveness 
and legitimate interests of credit institutions. Thus there is a minimum arrangement aimed at ensuring an orderly 
withdrawal. The authors thank Adrian Dumitrescu for bringing this point to their attention.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2117
buttressing the ECB’s authority. Finally, the SSM is broad in scope and very large in size, 
allowing it to exploit economies of scale with regard to expert knowledge (Ernia 2019). 
The issues related to the lack of representation of the central banks as prudential 
supervisory authorities entering into close cooperation with the ECB in its decision-making 
structures (Supervisory Board and Governing Council) have been dealt with in the ECB 
decision on the establishment of close cooperation between the ECB and the central banks 
of Bulgaria and Croatia (ECB Decision 2020e, 2020f) namely, a representative of each of 
the central banks as the prudential supervisory authority participates and exercises voting 
rights in the Supervisory Board; and the central bank representative to the Supervisory 
Board participates and exercises voting rights in deliberations on the adoption by the ECB 
of instructions with regard to the identification of significant supervised entities established 
in their countries pursuant to Art. 110 of the SSM Framework Regulation.
Furthermore, the central banks of Croatia and Bulgaria will be full members of the ECB 
Governing Council once they meet the requirements to join the EMU (including the convergence 
criteria related to the ERM II). The benefits of the close-cooperation arrangement and 
participation in the SSM are several and constitute an important incentive for these countries 
to align their supervisory practices with the ECB and develop a good working relationship 
between the ECB and their NCAs. Both countries are aligning their supervisory practices to the 
highest standards – indeed, the ECB can be considered de facto a standard setter (Darvas and 
Wolf 2013, Belkea et al. 2016, 119, Kudrna 2016, 119, Mérö and Piroska 2016, 215, Mitręga-
Niestrój and Puszer 2015, 400-407, Vollmer 2016, 7). Moreover, the commitment to join the 
Monetary Union minimises the authority risk for the ECB, as safeguards become insignificant 
and termination is a non-issue. Hence, the incentive for simultaneous application to join the 
ERM II and to enter close cooperation is apparent, as incentives for joining the Monetary Union 
and being part of the Banking Union converge.
4.1  The case of macroprudential supervision in close cooperation when applying 
for membership of the euro
The complementarity of monetary and macroprudential policies yields superior outcomes 
to a world where monetary policy – or macroprudential policy – is pursued on its own and 
in the absence of the other policy (Nier and Kang 2016, 27 - 38). One argument is that 
macroprudential policy can build buffers that can be eased in periods of financial stress. 
Such a policy can help keep open the transmission of monetary policy, preserving its 
effectiveness in the event of such stress. This is the rationale for preparing to join both the 
EMU and the Banking Union. 
Table 3 shows that both Bulgaria and Croatia generally classify banks included 
in the ECB list of significant banks as O-SIIs, and illustrates the capital buffer rate they 
are expected to build up according to the existing macroprudential rules in the EU. The 
exceptions are in Croatia, where Raiffeisen Stambena Stedionica DD-Croatia and PBZ 
Stambena Stedinoca DD are not designated as O-SIIs despite the fact that their parents, 
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Raiffesen Bank International and Intesa Sanpaolo respectively, are O-SIIs in their home 
countries. Also, Adiko Bank DD is designated as an O-SII by the Croatian authorities although 
it is not by its home NDA (Luxembourg). As mentioned, both member states have identified 
a large proportion of their banks as systemically important from a domestic perspective. 
This shows that the O-SII criteria utilise an approach that focuses on the domestic systemic 
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implications by assessing the extent to which a bank’s business activities are substitutable 
and the level of interconnectedness within the market. 
The banks designated by Bulgaria as O-SIIs are also classified as such in the ultimate 
parent member states. For example, in Bulgaria Unicredit Bulbank AD, United Bulgarian 
Bank and Raiffeisenbank Austria DD are designated as O-SIIs and so are the parents, 
Unicredit SPA (G-SIB), KBC (O-SII) and Raiffeisenbank (O-SII) in Italy, Belgium and Austria 
respectively. In the case of Croatia, Zagrebacka Banka DD, Privredna Banka Zagreb DD and 
Erste & Steiermarkische Bank DD are designated as O-SII and so are the parents, Unicredit 
SPA (G-SIB), Intesa Sanpaolo and Erste Group Bank (O-SIIs) in Italy and Austria respectively. 
MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURES: BANKS IN THE ECB LIST OF BANKS DIRECTLY SUPERVISED IN BULGARIA 
AND CROATIA (cont'd)
Table 3













Systemic Risk Buffers 
(SRB) There is no 
maximum limit for this 
buffer, but depending on 
its level and the impact on 
other Member States, 
authorisation from the 
European Commission 
may be required
Mandatory or voluntary 
reciprocity of foreign 
macroprudential 
measures according to 
recommendation 
ESRB/2015/2

































Erste Group Bank: 
2% (01/2020)
Erste & S Bank: 2% 
(01/2020)



















)enoN( airtsuA)serusopxE llA %2( airtsuAAN
Adiko Bank DD Y(AI LAKE 
S.a.r.l.,Luxem
burg )
NA Adiko Bank d.d. 1% 
(01/2020)
Luxemburg NA Luxemburg (None)
Sberbank DD Y (Sberbank 
Europe AG 
Austria)





















BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2117
The Article 135 of the Capital Requirement Directive 2013/36/EU enables member states to 
reciprocate with respect to macroprudential requirements to minimise the distorting effects 
such requirements could have on the competitiveness of banks located in other member 
states.12 Currently, only Austria – where the ultimate parent resides – has taken reciprocal 
measures either to increase or to reduce the capital buffer rates. Under close cooperation, 
the ECB may request countries to adopt or increase levels of capital and liquidity for the 
purposes of managing counter-cyclical and systemic macro-prudential risks.
12  For the powers of the European Systemic Risk Board to recommend reciprocity, see European Systemic Risk Board 
2018, 48. The reported rate in Table 3 is the rate applied to domestic exposures, and the effective bank-specific rates 
may differ. The SRB is cumulated to the higher of the O-SII and G-SII buffers, in line with Article 133(5) of the Capital 
Requirement Directive.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2117
5  The crisis management incentives for entering into close cooperation 
when applying to EMU
The move towards centralisation of decision-making in bank crisis resolution and mechanisms 
of financial support based on mutualisation of funding are important incentives for entering 
close cooperation, to minimise the home and host dilemma associated to the asymmetry of 
information and the need to align incentives among safety-net regulators. In the SRM those 
entering close cooperation will see a shift in decision-making about resolution from the national 
resolution authority (NRA) to the SRB, with the practical execution of the resolution scheme 
residing with the NRA (European Central Bank 2019b). The operation of close cooperation within 
the SRM will not differ much from the operation of the SRM within the euro area. Furthermore, 
as it is the case for euro-area countries, member states in close cooperation retain critical 
responsibilities for emergency liquidity assistance and precautionary recapitalisation of solvent 
banks that have short-term liquidity and capital assistance needs (Art. 32(4) and 31 of the 
BRRD). These responsibilities reside at the national level regardless of whether a member state 
is in close cooperation or a full-fledged member of the eurozone. 
A critical feature has been the move towards mutualisation of financial support 
through the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) (ECB 2019b). In this respect, those entering close 
cooperation are required to introduce legislation to mutualise their national fund formally with 
the other participating member states that are already members of the EMU. The reduction of 
autonomy is offset by access to a larger pool of funds for bank crisis resolution, including the 
possibility of a backstop credit line from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Agreement 
amending the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 2021, Agreement amending 
Intergovernmental Agreement 2021). The common backstop will help to ensure that a bank failure 
does not harm the broader economy or cause financial instability. 
The most debatable aspect of close cooperation, as in the Banking Union, is likely 
to be in the field of resolution decision-making (Binder 2019, 314 - 330). The ECB decides 
for significant banks whether a bank is failing or likely to fail, and the SRB decides how the 
bank will be resolved in either resolution or insolvency liquidation (Art. 18(1) SRMR). For 
the significant banks of Bulgaria and Croatia it will be the SRB’s responsibility to decide 
which resolution options to use – resolution or insolvency proceedings, according to national 
law. This relocates decision-making away from the NCA of the relevant member state, so 
the question that arises is how is this administered? Is participation in close cooperation 
equivalent or comparable to euro-area member states’ participation?
Member states entering close cooperation must introduce legislation to ensure the 
NRA has the legal administrative authority to adhere to SRB decisions within the SRM. In 
the cases of Bulgaria13 and Croatia14 domestic legislation was amended to this effect. The 
13  Law amending and supplementing the Law on Rehabilitation and Restructuring of Credit Institutions and Investment 
Intermediaries, Decree No. 103, 2 May 2019.
14 The Act on the amendments to the Credit Institutions Act (Official Gazette No 47/20).
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reforms ensure the tasks and decisions of the NRA comply with the SRMR. The domestic 
leglislative reforms extends to SRB decisions, guidelines and general instructions. In this 
respect, Ivana Parać Vukomanović 2020, director of the Croatia National Bank Financial 
and Supervisory Law Department, highlights the important distinction between close 
cooperation in the SSM and SRM: the SRB has “direct authority” in Croatia, in contrast to the 
ECB within the SSM (“indirect authority” via the NCA) (Vukomanović 2020, 73). It is argued 
the SRB’s relationship with member states in close cooperation within the SRM is therefore 
“equivalent” to rather than “comparable” with the ECB in the SSM, as shown above. 
According to Art. 7(1), 8 and 10 of the SRMR, the SRB in the SRM is reliant on 
the NRA to execute its resolution strategy. The SRB exercises a range of responsibilities 
on be half of member states in close cooperation, such as assessing resolvability and 
resolution planning to decide on the ultimate resolution strategy (Art. 7(2) of the SRMR). 
Disputes relating to these matters between the SRB and NRAs are open to appeal to the 
SRB Appeal Panel as specified under Art. 85 of the SRMR). The decision of the Appeal 
Panel is binding, and the decision in question will need to be amended accordingly (Art. 
85(7) of the SRMR).
These responsibilities are specifically exercised over designated significant banks 
or those the ECB decides to supervise directly, and other SRB designated cross-border 
groups according to Art. 7(2)(a)(b) of SRMR. The compliance of member states in close 
cooperation emanates from the fact that they are participants in the SRMR, similar to euro-
area member states, and thus fall within each part of the SRMR requirements as if they were 
euro-area member states. The exception is the possibility of the member state terminating 
close cooperation in the SSM and so also the SRM as a participating member state (Art. 7 
of SSM Regulation, Art. 4(2)(3) of SRMR).
Bulgaria and Croatia introduced domestic legislation to transfer and mutualise their 
resolution funds with the SRF.15 Ratification of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single 
Resolution Fund (IGA) 2014 opens the door for Bulgaria and Croatia entering into close 
cooperation. Art. 12 and 13 of the IGA give contracting parties the possibility of future 
ratification of the agreement. This enables member states committed to entering close 
cooperation to make the requisite transfers from a domestic resolution fund in compliance 
with the target level for its resolution financing arrangements of 1 per cent of the covered 
deposits of all credit institutions (Art. 8 of the IGA, Art. 67 (4) of the SRMR). The IGA ceases 
to apply, in line with Art. 7(2) of the SSM, once a member state terminates close cooperation 
in the SSM (Art. 12 of the IGA). Art. 15 of the IGA provides reimbursement once a member 
state no longer participates in the SSM, that also in line with Art. 4(3)(a)-(c) of the SRMR. 
However, as explained above, the possibility of termination fades with the commitment to 
join the euro once Bulgaria and Croatia fulfil the convergence criteria. 
15  Bulgaria: Act ratifying the Agreement on the transfer and mutual use of contributions to the Single Restructuring Fund, 
Decree No. 264; Croatia: Official Gazette, International Part No 1/2020.
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The recent reforms to the Treaty Establishing the ESM 2011 provide a separate 
backstop to the SRF if its resources are depleted by its use in a bank resolution. The 
Amended ESM Treaty 2021 enables member states entering close cooperation to contribute 
as participants. The Amended ESM Treaty 2021 formalises the initiative of the Euro Summit 
of 29 June 2018 to provide a backstop to the SRF. Member states in close cooperation 
are not contracting parties to the amending treaty, which remains exclusively for euro-area 
member states, but the backstop provides additional support to the SRF function of providing 
financial assistance during a crisis in a fiscally neutral manner. The reforms to the ESM to 
introduce the backstop provide incentives to enter close cooperation by guaranteeing the 
benefits of this backstop to the SRF. In many respects this is appropriate given that those 
entering into close cooperation are required to mutualise their national funds, so they should 
also benefit from the backstop and indeed contribute to that effort. The new Recital 9a of 
the Amended ESM Treaty 2021 enables those in close cooperation “to provide parallel credit 
lines for the SRF alongside the ESM”. According to Art. 6 of the Amended ESM Treaty 2021, 
participating member states will also be able to attend backstop-related meetings of the 
Board of Governors and Board of Directors of the ESM as observers.
5.1  Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
In Bulgaria the Bulgarian National Bank is the resolution authority and the Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme (DGS) has responsibilities akin to those of a “paybox plus”, with resolution functions 
including managing the deposit guarantee fund and bank resolution fund, as well as 
appointing trustees in bank bankruptcy (IADI 2020). In Croatia the Croatian National Bank 
decides whether a bank enters resolution and the State Agency for Deposit Insurance and 
Bank Resolution is responsible for initiating a “loss-minimising” resolution strategy. Table 4 
gives a comparison of the euro-area safety net and the safety nets of Bulgaria and Croatia. 
Croatia has two designated resolution authorities: the central bank and the DGS. In view 
of this, Croatian law had to be amended to give only the central bank the right to vote 
at the SRB plenary and executive sessions (Vukomanović 2020, 74). The Croatian DGS 
submits an opinion if it needs to be involved in a resolution strategy (Vukomanović 2020,74). 
In Bulgaria, the central bank is the resolution and it has the voting rights on the SRB plenary 
and executive sessions.
The SRMR extends to the potential use of the national DGS in resolution for 
participating member states according to the Art. 79 of the SRMR. The DGS remains a 
national competency in accordance with the DGS Directive in view of the lack of a European 
Deposit Insurance System. Art. 79(4) of the SRMR specifies the SRB could mandate 
national DGS funds in resolution to compensate covered depositors, and could use the 
DGS if the eligible deposits transferred via the sale of a business or bridge institution are 
below the aggregated covered level. In this respect, the Bulgarian BDIF, can provide financial 
assistance in the resolution of a bank by absorbing losses for the insured depositors in 
the resolution process. However, the powers it had to establish bridge institution and an 
asset management vehicle were transferred to the Bulgarian central bank. In a package of 
reforms while entering in to close cooperation which also saw its responsibility for managing 
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the resolution fund with it ultimately being mutualised with the SRF.16 This emphasises the 
importance of the funding levels of the national DGSs. 
The level of confidence in the DGS of any banking system relies on a variety of 
factors, with the level of pre-existing funds for covering depositor reimbursements being the 
principal element (European Banking Authority 2020). The DGS Directive expects member 
states to have in place a target-level fund of 0.8 per cent of covered deposits, although 
in exceptional cases it can be as low as 0.5 per cent.17 Bulgaria and Croatia have both 
opted for much higher target levels, with 1.0 per cent (Bulgaria) and 2.5 per cent (Croatia) of 
covered deposits; more importantly, Croatia has achieved the funding level and Bulgaria is 
only just below the target. In these cases it must be a precautionary sign of the likely use of 
the DGS fund, yet it also indicates prudence exercised by both countries. 
The proportion of EU bank subsidiaries in comparison to the number of EU branches 
is significantly higher in both Bulgaria and Croatia in comparison to other EU member states 
where a branch-based model is prevalent (with Luxembourg as the exception – see Appendix 
6, Table 6.1, Singh 2020). This is despite the incentives the single passporting regime 
provides for the adoption of a branch-based model. In the case of branches, the recast of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2014/49/EU on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes expects member state DGSs to work together when a cross-border bank fails. The 
home-country DGS is still expected to cover branch depositors in the host member states. 
The host DGS is expected to make repayments to branch depositors according to the home-
country DGS’s instructions. The home DGS can also request financial assistance from the host 
16  § 56, para 1 of the Transitional and Final Provisions of the Law on Amendment of the LRRCIIF (State Gazette, issue 
37 of 7 May 2019).
17  The International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) highlights that a target level of 1.15 per cent was proposed, 
but this met opposition based on the view that resolution techniques and the resolution fund would reduce the burden 
on the DGS. 
COMPARISON OF SAFETY NETS
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis.
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DGS to orchestrate a pay-out. The cooperation arrangement between the hosts’ supervisors 
and the ECB would support the cooperation agreement between home and host DGSs, to 
the extent that potential losses and liquidity needs of the DGSs in Croatia and Bulgaria will be 
minimised by the limitation of information asymmetries and prudential supervisory practices at 
the highest standards.
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6  Conclusion
This paper seeks to assess the incentives for entering close cooperation for two countries 
that are also applying to become members of the EMU (Bulgaria and Croatia) by looking 
at three key areas: the duality of ERM II membership and entering close cooperation, 
the supervisory incentives, and the crisis management incentives for entering into close 
cooperation when joining the EMU is the ultimate objective. 
The expectation of entry into the ERM and later the adoption of the euro as 
a precursor to the Banking Union was not originally expressed in the SSM and SRM 
Regulations. The linkage of close cooperation to ERM II participation has the crucial effect 
of binding EMU-applying countries more closely to the Banking Union. It is more difficult for 
a national central bank or NCA to exercise discretion in implementing ECB decisions once 
it is committed to the path leading to full EMU membership. Hence the commitment to join 
the EMU minimises the authority risk for the ECB as well as the SRB, as safeguards become 
insignificant and termination is not an issue. Uncertainty about the functioning and durability 
of the close-cooperation arrangement is largely removed. The incentive for simultaneous 
application to join the ERM II and enter close cooperation is apparent, as the incentives for 
joining the EMU and being part of the Banking Union converge. 
It is evident from the research undertaken in this paper that there are clear benefits 
of close cooperation for these member states whose domestic currencies are already 
linked to the euro, in view of the dominant position euro-area banks have in their respective 
domestic markets. 
The strictness of the significance criteria does not lead to a potential position that only 
the top three banks fall within the ECB’s remit, in view of the ECB list of Bulgarian and Croatian 
banks that it supervises as of October 2020. The ECB’s encompassing approach seems to 
consider not only the domestic systemic importance of banks but also the importance of their 
cross-border operations. Against this background, a significant proportion of the total assets 
of the banking systems in Bulgaria and Croatia (58.09 per cent and 73 per cent respectively) 
is brought under centralised supervision and resolution. In the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia, 
this means no national bank would be supervised by the ECB but only the subsidiaries of the 
foreign EU banks. Since foreign EU banks in Bulgaria and Croatia make up the different ways 
of categorising significance in accordance with the SSMR. 
On the macroprudential side, Bulgarian and Croatian banks will now be open to 
scrutiny by the ECB, which may request them to adopt or increase levels of capital and 
liquidity for the purposes of managing macroprudential risks. Both countries had taken a 
more precautionary approach of designating a larger number of banks as O-SIIs, and so 
domestically significant: all banks under the indirect supervision of the ECB are designated 
as O-SIIs in Bulgaria and all but three banks in Croatia. The case of Croatia suggests 
the importance that the ECB attaches to other aspects of determining significance, such the 
relevance of cross-border activity, when deciding the categorisation of banks. 
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With close cooperation, decision-making about resolution shifts from the NRA to 
the SRB, with the practical execution of the resolution scheme still residing with the former. 
It is argued that the SRB’s relationship with member states in close cooperation within the 
SRM is therefore “equivalent” rather than “comparable”, as with the ECB in the SSM. A 
critical feature is the mutualisation of assistance through the SRF, including the possibility of 
a backstop credit line from the ESM. A country entering close cooperation has to merge its 
national resolution fund into that shared by existing Banking Union members. This reduction 
of autonomy is offset by access to a larger pool of funds and direct involvement in decision-
making about the parent groups of significant banks in Bulgaria and Croatia via participation 
in the SRB.
Bulgaria’s and Croatia’s experience with close cooperation and abidance by the ERM 
II will be closely studied by other non-euro EU countries and by the ECB. The experience of 
these two leaders may be of greatest interest to aquis countries that are members of the EU, 
whose banking systems are largely dominated by euro-area banks, and which may aspire to 
eventual membership of the EMU and the Banking Union.
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